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NOTES
discharge for a first offense is too severe. (2) There is a qualifi-
cation that if the company proceeds properly and acts in good
faith, it is wholly within its discretion to rule that gambling will
not be permitted on its premises, and that discharge will be the
penalty. Company rules are usually left within the discretion of
the company, and if said rules are not harsh or arbitrary, the
union cannot object. Thus, if there is proper publication of the
rules and the penalty, arbitrators uphold the company in dis-
charging an employee for gambling. (3) As to those in a posi-
tion of responsibility with the company or the union, arbitrators
charge them with notice of the rules and the penalty for viola-
tion, and uphold discharge even for the first offense.
LESLIE BRYAN
INCOMPETENCY
Incompetency is one of the most frequent encountered reasons
advanced by management as "just cause" for the discharge or
disciplining of an employee. Although, as a general proposition,
proof of an employee's incompetency satisfies the "cause" limita-
tion on the managerial disciplinary power, the existence of cer-
tain factors will not only affect the severity of the penalty im-
posed, but may even prohibit the imposition of any penalty. It
is the purpose of this note to consider, first, what types of em-
loyee conduct amount to incompetency, and, second, what mitigat-
ing factors may operate in the employee's favor.
1. TYPES OF EMPLOYEE CONDUCT
If an employee is physically incapable for performing his as-
signed duties, it is obvious that some change in his status is
justified. The awards indicate that discharge is justifiable only
as a last resort. If continued employment in the same position
would endanger the health and safety of other employees, and
there is no suitable transfer available, "just cause" for discharge
has been found to exist.' On the other hand, if there is no health
hazard to other employees involved, and there are other jobs
which the employee could perform, an arbitrator has held that
discharge is improper.2
1. In re Pacific Mills and Textile Workers Union of America, Local 254
(CIO), 2 LA 326 (1945).
2. In re American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corporation, Malle-
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The technical inability of an employee to perform his assigned
duties is often evidenced by negligent acts. Ordinarily, a single
act of negligence is not regarded as just cause for discharge,
though some disciplinary measure may be imposed. Neverthe-
less, even in the absence of any evidence of prior negligence, the
discharge of an employee whose careless act resulted in substan-
tial injury to the machine on which he had been working has been
upheldA Similarly, the discharge of an employee who fixed only
part of the machinery which he was ordered to repair was sus-
tained.4
That the seriousness of the incident is the key fact in this line
of cases is indicated in In re Boston & Maine Transportation
Company.5 A truck-driver, discharged for running into a pedes-
trian, was ordered reinstated only after he was acquitted of a
manslaughter charge. The arbitrator stated that the discharge
would have been justified, even though the employee's record was
free of prior negligence, had the employee been found guilty.
However, the mere fact that an employee has been involved in a
serious accident is not just cause for discharge if there is no
causal relation between the negligence of the employee and the
damage sustained. Thus, in In re Malone and Hyde, Inc., a
truck driver who had been discharged was reinstated upon proof
that brake failure was largely responsible for the serious acci-
dent in which he was involved. At least one arbitrator has used
degrees of negligence as a criterion for cause for discharge
where a single act is involved. If the act is only "ordinarily"
negligent, discharge is unwarranted; but if the act is "grossly"
or "maliciously" negligent, the discharge is said to be for
"cause."T
able Steel Plant and United Steelworkers of America, Local 2580 (CIO),
2 LA 245 (1946).
3. In re Tri-United Plastics Corp. and United Gas, Coke and Chemical
Workers of America, Local 242 (CIO), 2 LA 398 (1946).
4. In re Auto-Lite Battery Corporation, and United Automobile, Aircraft
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (CIO), 3 LA 122 (1946).
The arbitrator emphasized the carelessness demonstrated by this act, rather
than the violation of rules aspect.
5. In re Boston & Maine Transportation Company and Amalgamated
Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees, Local
1038 (AFL), 5 LA 3 (1946).
6. In re Malone and Hyde, Inc., and Food, Tobacco, Agricultural and
Allied Workers Union of America, Local 19 (CIO), 5 LA 443 (1946).
7. In re The Glenn L. Martin Company and United Automobile,'Aircraft
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 738 (CIO), 6 LA
500 (1947).
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An accumulation of minor incidents of carelessness, on the
other hand, shows a lack of adaptability for the job in issue and
thus has generally been held to constitute incompetency., Such
extended negligence may, in fact, demonstrate a lack of adapta-
bility for any job.9 Thus, a truck-driver who had an unusual
number of accidents, at least part of which were attributable to
his carelessness, was properly discharged. 0 As one arbitrator has
said, a discharge may be upheld where the evidence indicates a
"pattern of unsatisfactory work."'1 If the extended carelessness
of the employee is actually dangerous, management can discharge
properly even when there is a failure to follow the contract pro-
cedure for discharge.1" A truck-driver who travels at an exces-
sive rate of speed as a matter of habit is an example of such
dangerous conduct. However, the basic inefficiency of the em-
ployee himself rather than a mere personality conflict with his
immediate supervisor must be the cause of his inadequate per-
formance. 13
The scope given to the definition of incompetency is nowhere
better illustrated than in awards which hold that a persistent
refusal to follow orders is incompetency. The rationale employed
by arbitrators is that such a persistent disregard of rules con-
stitutes negligence. This is clearly indicated where the refusal
to follow orders results in sub-standard work or damage to the
employer's property. In In re Micamold Radio Corp., 4 a con-
densor molder continually disregarded oral instructions to comply
with the proper time cycle, used in the production of condensors.
The condensors produced by him were defective, and he was
8. In re Art Chrome Company of America and United Furniture Work-
ers of America, Local 136-B (CIO), 11 LA 932 (1948); In re Republic Oil
Refining Company and Oil Workers International Union, Local 449 (CIO),
2 LA 305 (1946); In re Standard Forgings Corporation and United Steel-
workers of America, Local 1720 (CIO), 6 LA 55 (1946).
9. In re C. F. Hathaway Company and Amalgamated Clothing Workers
of America, Local 486 (CIO), 6 LA 216 (1947).
10. In re Schreiber Trucking Co. and Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local 118 (AFL), 5 LA 430 (1946).
11. In re Bakelite Corporation and Chemical & Crafts Union, Incorpo-
rated, 1 LA 227 (1945).
12. In re Jacobs Transfer Company, Inc., and International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local 639 (AFL),
2 LA 631 (1946).
13. In re Electronic Corporation of America and United Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers of America, Local 430 (CIO), 3 LA 217 (1946).
14. In re Micamold Radio Corp. and United Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers of America, Local 430 (CIO), 3 LA 459 (1946).
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properly discharged. In In re Glenn L. Martin Co.,1 a woman
employee attempted to cover up defective work on the part of a
fellow-employee. This was a clear violation of an established
plant rule. As a result of her conduct, a valuable machine was
extensively damaged. The arbitrator adjudged her to be incom-
petent and sustained her discharge by the company. Thus, it
appears that regardless of the terminology employed by the
arbitrator to describe the misconduct, a persistent refusal to
follow orders resulting in poor work or material damage to
property is "just cause" for discharge. The rule seems to have
been unduly extended in In re U. S. Cartridge Co.,10 where a
steadfast refusal to submit to a medical examination was held to
amount to incompetency even though there was no showing that
the employee's work was not up to standard nor that any prop-
erty damage resulted.
Another, and perhaps the most frequently found basis for a
finding of incompetency, is a failure to maintain an adequate
production rate. Every employee must, of necessity, produce at
a rate approximately equal to that of other workers on similar
jobs. A failure to do so indicates incompetency and will warrant.
some form of discipline. Thus, in In re Universal Tool Corp.,17
an employee who took an average of 160 hours to turn out work
that normally required 100 hours was properly discharged.
Similarly, the discharge of a milk route salesman was sustained
on a showing that his sales were falling off at the same time
that other salesmen with comparable territories were either
maintaining their sales level or improving it.13 It is not neces-
sary for the employee's inefficiency to have already reached sub-
stantial proportions, if it is clear that it soon must do so because
of the increasing difficulty of the work, 19 even when no trial
15. In re The Glenn L. Martin Company and United Automobile, Aircraft
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 738, 6 LA 500
(1947).
16. In re United States Cartridge Company and United Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers of America, Local 825 (CIO), 1 LA 494 (1945).
17. In re Universal Tool Co. and United Automobile Workers of America,
Local 785 (CIO), 4 LA 731 (1946) ; In re Timm Industries, Inc. and Inter-
national Association of Machinists, Lodge 758, 11 LA 308 (1948).
18. In re O'Dowd's Dairy and International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Milk Drivers and
Dairy Employees Union, Local 680 (AFL), 3 LA 344 (1946).
19. In re Gray Advertising Agency, Inc., and United Office and Profes-
sional Workers of America, Local 20 (CIO), 7 LA 107 (1947).
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period is provided by the contract.20 Additional relevant factors
in all these cases are the necessity of constant supervision and
a failure to improve after a warning and an adequate opportunity
to do so have been provided.2 1
The relative importance of the employee's job in the scheme of
plant organization is a significant factor in determining his in-
competency for failing to maintain an adequate rate of produc-
tion. Thus, if substandard production on a particular job would
seriously curtail total plant output, an admittedly inefficient em-
ployee may be properly discharged even though it is shown that
other equally incompetent employees were retained.22 The arbi-
trator felt that it would be unjust to condition the right to dis-
charge on the ground that the one so discharged must be the
most incompetent of the group.
The union may undertake certain obligations in the collective
bargaining contract which bear on the power of management to
discharge or discipline for incompetency. A typical provision is
a union pledge to support a company program of maximum pro-
duction. In In re Pressed Steel Car Co.,23 an employee's work
was unsatisfactory and his output light compared to that of other
employees with similar opportunities. Another employee who
had started with the discharged employee outproduced him to a
marked degree in a short period of time. Aided by this definite
standard of comparison, the arbitrator held that to force the
company to continue the worker's employment would violate the
union's contractual pledge.
The company-union relationship may assume significance in
still another way. Some employees are also union officials. Ar-
bitrators have reached diametrically opposite conclusions as to
the precise effect of that fact. In In re Michigan Contracting
Corp.,24 the arbitrator upheld the discharge of a union steward
with a poor production record, on the basis that he, as a union
20. Ibid.
21. In re Kaiser Company, Inc. and United Steelworkers of America(CIO), 1 ALAA 67,467 (1946).
22. In re Kaiser Company, Inc., Lyon & Steel Division and United Steel
Workers of America (CIO), 4 LA 346 (1946).
23. In re Pressed Steel Car Co., Inc., and United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica, Local 1844 (CIO), 2 LA 332 (1946).
24. In re Michigan Contracting Corp. and International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 247(AFL), 2 LA 630 (1946).
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representative, should assume added responsibility for the main-
tenance of production. On the other hand, It re Nathan Manu-
facturing Co., 25 the arbitrator, although upholding the discharge
of a union steward whose production record was 50 per cent
below standard, said that a union steward should be discharged
only for "very good cause."
II. MITIGATING FACTORS
Up to this point we have been primarily concerned with the
types of conduct to which the label of incompetency has been
appended by arbitrators. A survey of the awards reveals con-
clusively that even though factual incompetency may be estab-
lished, certain mitigating factors operate in the employee's favor
to limit or prohibit an otherwise justifiable discharge.
When a worker has been employed for a considerable length
of time, it is clear that a discharge for incompetency will be very
difficult to sustain, primarily because it will be harder to prove
the charge. Where the element of physical incompetency is pres-
ent, a ruling that an employee with a long service record should
be reinstated and transferred to another job, commensurate with
his ability and seniority, and where his health would not be
jeopardized, is proper.2 In a case where an employee with seven-
teen years seniority was promoted to department manager and
there found incompetent, the arbitrator ordered him reinstated
and ruled that he must be given at least a six-months' trial in
another department of another store.27 In a similar case, a
worker with ten years service was promoted to a higher-rated
job, found inefficient, and discharged. He was ordered rein-
stated, the arbitrator suggesting that demotion to his old job
rather than discharge was the proper disciplinary action "in
view of his long service. '' 28
A case of extreme abuse of discretion on the part of manage-
25. In re Nathan Manufacturing Company and International Association
of Machinists, District #15, Local Lodge #402, 7 LA 3 (1947).
26. In re American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp. and United
Steelworkers of America, Local 2580 (CIO), 2 LA 245 (1946).
27. In re Safeway Stores, Inc. and -Amalgamated Meat Cutters and
Butcher Workmen of North America, Local 302 (AFL), 4 LA 125 (1946).
28. In re Jarecki Machine & Tool Company and International Union,
United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of Amer-
ica, Local 944 (CIO), 3 LA 41 (1946).
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ment is In re January & Wood Co.,2 9 in which two elderly women
were discharged after 24 and 27 years of service. Instead of
conceding their inefficiency, the arbitrator reasoned that "con-
sidering their advanced age, they were not inefficient." He might
have ruled, with equal justification, that, while the women were
inefficient, they could not be discharged because of their long
service. When the same result is reached on the basis of different
reasoning, it is immaterial whether the arbitrator chooses to
consider the seniority as a mitigating factor, or as a matter going
to the proof of incompetency. In a number of other awards,30
the length of service of the employee was a factor considered in
ordering reinstatement, although there were other grounds as
well. For example, in In re Sperry Gyroscope Co.,31 the arbi-
trator flatly declared that "the employee's long and previously
excellent work record cannot be ignored."
Many awards have ordered reinstatement when the employee
was discharged without any hint or forewarning that his work
was unsatisfactory-the so-called "sudden-death" discharge.
Where the basis of the discharge is a series of incidents such as
negligent acts, prior warning or complaint is a condition prece-
dent to the right to discharge for incompetency.32 Thus, in one
case a discharge "for failure to meet production standards" was
held improper where the standards were not known by, nor
explained to, the worker.33 However, the failure to notify the
employee has been overlooked where the union was notified and
acquiesced in the lack of warning to the employee.3 4 Even where
29. In re The January & Wood Company and Textile Workers Union of
America (CIO), 6 LA 7 (1946).
30. In re Nineteen Hundred Corporation and United Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers of America, Local 931 (CIO), 6 LA 709 (1946); In
re Curtiss-Wright Corporation and United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricul-
tural Implement Workers of America, Local 927 (CIO), 11 LA 139 (1948);
In re Sperry Gyroscope Co., Inc. and United Electrical Radio and Machine
Workers of America, Local 450 (CIO), 11 LA 553 (1948).
31. In re Sperry Gyroscope Co., Inc. and United Electrical Radio and
Machine Workers of America, Local 450 (CIO), 11 LA 553 (1948).
32. In re International Association of Machinists, Aeronautical Indus-
trial District Lodge #727 and Office Employees International Union, Local
30 (AFL), 7 LA 231 (1947).
33. In re L. F. Faler Machine Company and United Steelworkers of
America, Local 3722 (CIO), 7 LA 935 (1947).
34. In re Shwayder Brothers, Inc. and International Fur and Leather
Workers Union, Local 96 (CIO), 7 LA 552 (1947).
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gross incompetence is clearly proved, if there is lack of super-
vision or notice, the discharge is improper.3
Apparently there is no set or clearly defined standard as to the
type of notice which must be given. Oral warnings seem to be
enough, 36 and the failure to protest warning notices through the
grievance procedure is tantamount to admitting the justification
for them.37 Several other cases have given a failure to warn or
give notice as one of a number of reasons for ordering rein-
statement.3 8
Closely related factors are the successful completion of a trial
period and periodic wage increases. These factors, of course,
tend to rebut evidence of incompetency, and in many cases where
there seems to be clear evidence of inefficiency, the arbitrators
order reinstatement with a recommendation to demotion if such
factors are present. In re Bastian.-Morley Co., Inc., 0 clearly
points this up. There the worker had successfully completed his
trial period and had been granted two wage increases. Suddenly,
the company charged him with inefficiency and discharged him.
The arbitrator ordered reinstatement, saying that demotion,
rather than discharge, was the proper remedy under the circum-
stances. In another case the contract provided for a six-months'
trial period which had been completed by the employee. A dis-
charge on the ground that the employee's "initial qualifications
were lacking" was held to be improper,40 the arbitrator stating
that "survival of the trial period must be accepted as proof of
his initial qualification." In a similar case,41 a discharged car-
penter who had survived the trial period was ordered reinstated,
the conclusion being that he was no more incompetent then than
he was at the end of his trial period. Therefore, he was still
35. In re Art Chrome Co. of America and United Furniture Workers of
America, Local 136-B (CIO), 11 LA 932 (1948).
36. In re The Glenn L. Martin Company and United Automobile, Air-
craft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 738 (CIO),
6 LA 500 (1947).
37. In re Timm Industries, Inc. and International Association of Ma-
chinists, Lodge 758, 11 LA 308 (1948).
38. In re Die Tool and Engineering Company and Int'l. Union United
Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America,
Local 155, 1 ALAA 67,313 (1946).
39. In re Bastian-Morley Company, Inc. and United Farm Equipment
and Metal Workers of America, Local 173 (CIO), 3 LA 412 (1946).
40. In re Neches Britane Products Company and Oil Workers Interna-
tional Union, Local 22-S (CIO), 5 LA 307 (1946).
41. In re The Master Electric Company and United Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers of America, Local 754 (CIO), 5 LA 339 (1946).
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qualified for the job that he held at the end of the trial period,
even though he might not be able to handle the job which he held
at the time of discharge, and so the proper disciplinary action
was demotion. In a case where no trial period was provided for
in the contract, but where numerous wage increases had been
granted, failure to meet production standards was held not to be
sufficient to warrant discharge.4 2 It should be noted that the
union agreed to relieve the employee of his union duties which
were materially contributing to his inefficiency, and the arbitra-
tor felt that the wage increases showed that the man was capable
of doing his job if relieved of this additional burden.
If the case is a close one, a factor which may weigh heavily
against the sustaining of a discharge on grounds of incompetency
is an extended anti-union record on the part of the company.
Thus, in one case where the arbitrator held that there was suffi-
cient evidence of incompetency to warrant discharge, he never-
theless said that,
Where there is substantial evidence justifying a conclusion
that the employer is opposed to unions, or has shown a pre-
vious hostility to them, then the burden of showing incom-
petence would be on the employer to a greater degree than
in the absence of such a showing.43
Similar language is found in other awards,44 but if a gross
enough case of incompetency is established, the anti-union record
of the company would be of little consequence.
Except in extraordinary cases, the discharge of an employee
for clear incompetency will be set aside if the employer fails to
follow the contract procedure for discharge. If, however, the
incompetency of the employee is so extreme as to endanger the
safety of his fellow-employees or even of strangers, partial back
pay rather than reinstatement will be ordered even though the
correct procedure has not been followed.4 Where a lesser penalty
than discharge has been agreed upon by the union and the com-
pany, such an understanding may not be disregarded; and an
employee who has been discharged under such circumstances will
42. In re Sherron Metallic Corp. and Int'l. Associations of Machinists,
Local Lodge 295, District 15, 1 ALAA %67,314 (1946).
43. In re Grayson Heat Control Ltd. and United Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers of America, Local 1006 (CIO), 2 LA 335 (1945).
44. In re Universal Tool Company and United Automobile Workers of
America, Local 785 (CIO), 4 LA 731 (1946).
45. In re Schreiber Trucking Co. and Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local 118 (AFL), 5 LA 430 (1946).
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be ordered reinstated. 46 Similarly, where the contract provided
that the union must be notified of reasons for the employee's
discharge, a discharge was voided because the company failed to
give such notification-failure to abide by important details of
the discharge procedure bars an otherwise justified discharge.47
The same rule applies where the contract provides for notice to
the employee rather than the union.48 In the above situations,
reinstatement with full back pay was ordered. However, it seems
that there is nothing to prevent the employer from accepting the
award, reinstating the employee, then going through the correct
procedure and redischarging the employee.
Discharge, of course, is regarded as the maximum penalty, and
if the particular defect can be cured by transfer to another job,
transfer and not discharge is the proper remedy. In a case where
the employee was capable of handling a lower-rated job, but not
capable of handling a higher-rated one, he was reinstated to the
lower-rated one.4 9 It is significant that there was present in the
case the factor of anti-union discrimination. Occasionally, an
active union member may be promoted so fast that he cannot
adjust himself to his new position. Such a type of anti-union
activity can be effectively stopped by ordering a demotion rather
than allowing the company to discharge for incompetency.
There are some situations where the inefficiency of the em-
ployer is a factor contributing to the inefficiency of the employee.
'In such cases discharge will not be permitted. For example, an
employee was fired for lack of effort. When the evidence dis-
closed that his poor production record was due in part to the
lack of truck and crane facilities, he was ordered reinstated.0
It is equally clear that where inefficiency is partly due to inade-
46. In re Capco Steel & Engineering Company and United Steelworkers
of America, Local 2652 (CIO), 11 LA 414 (1948).
47. In re Die Tool and Engineering Company and Int'l. Union, United
Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America,
Local 155, 1 ALAA %67,313 (1946).
48. In re Art Chrome Co. of America and United Furniture Workers of
America, Local 136-B (CIO), 11 LA 932 (1948).
49. In re Kansas Motors and International Union, United Automobile,
Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 710
(CIO), 2 LA 283 (1945).
50. In re Alan Wood Steel Co. and United Steelworkers of America,
Local 1392 (CIO), 4 LA 52 (1946); and see, In re Alabama Freight Lines
and Int'l. Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Help-
ers, Transport and Local Delivery Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers,
Local 104 (AFL), 6 LA 754 (1947).
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quate supervision or training, a discharge for incompetency is
not justified.;' If an employee is promoted too fast for his own
ability the resulting incompetency is chargeable in part to the
company and discharge is unwarranted.5 2 The same rule applies
where there has been a transfer to a job for which the worker
is not qualified.5 3
III. CONCLUSION
We may conclude that an incompetent employee may be dis-
charged where there are no mitigating circumstances. Incom-
petency is generally made out if the employee is physically in-
competent, if he is careless over a period of time, if he has
committed any single act which could be characterized as grossly
negligent and where extensive damage to the employer's prop-
erty results, if he refuses to follow orders or rules, or if he is a
slow worker unable to keep up with the production rate set by
other workers, similarly trained and equipped.
The factors of length of service, the successful completion of a
trial period, periodic wage increases, an anti-union record on the
part of the employer will all mitigate against the discharge of an
otherwise incompetent worker. Furthermore, if the company
fails to give prior notice or warning to the employee, or fails to
abide by the discharge procedure set out in the contract, or if
the company itself, through its own fault, contributes to the
inefficiency of the employee, the employee will ordinarily be or-
dered reinstated.
H. JACKSON DANIEL
51. In re Jarecki Machine & Tool Co. and Int'l. Union, United Automo-
bile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 944
(CIO), 3 LA 40 (1946); In re McDonnell Aircraft Corp. and Int'l. Asso-
ciation of Machinists, District 9, 3 LA 158 (1946); In re Uptown Dental
Laboratories and United Office and Professional Workers of America,
Dental Technician Equity, Local 201 (CIO), 6 LA 950 (1947); In re Art
Chrome Co. of America and United Furniture Workers of America, Local
136-B (CIO), 11 LA 932 (1948).
52. In re The Federal Machine and Welder Co. and United Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers of America, Local 730 (CIO), 5 LA 60 (1946);
In re Acme Limestone Co. and United Mine Workers of America, District
50, Local 12424 (AFL), 6 LA 921 (1947).
53. In re Curtiss-Wright Corp. and United Automobile, Aircraft and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 927 (CIO), 11 LA 139
(1948).
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